responsibilities associated with it, continue to cause confusion despite concerted efforts of clarification. Significant friction exists between the geographic combatant commands, specifically responsible for operations within their theater, and the newly established United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the sub-unified command responsible for the global defense and operations in and through this critical domain.
Acknowledging the cyberspace domain exists without regard to geographic boundaries, who is in charge of operations in and through this domain and when? Examining proposed options and perspectives for command and control are necessary to determine the right balance to achieve unity of command and unity of effort in a global domain with regional implications.
CYBERSPACE: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
Although it is a man-made domain, cyberspace is now as relevant a domain for DoD activities as the naturally occurring domains of land, sea, air, and space.
-2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 1 Cyberspace is the newest war-fighting domain and is the only man-made domain. Because of the different man-made limitations, and conversely the lack of physical/geographic limitations imposed on it, this domain remains quite distinct and unique from the other domains of land, air, sea, and space. Does this distinctness require a unique command and control structure containing unique authorities?
Cyberspace transcends the normal geographical boundaries and typical time span relationships which characterize the physical domains. However, because it resides on, in, and through all the physical domains, the ability to command and control and retain specific authorities must have some of the same characteristics as that which exists on land, air, sea and in space. The requirement to manage, coordinate, and control actions in cyberspace does exist, and therefore a viable structure with clearly understood roles and authorities must be established.
The 2011 Unified Command Plan assigns specific cyberspace responsibilities to the Commander of United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), to include: direct the operation and defense of DoD networks, plan against cyberspace threats, coordinate with combatant commands and other US government agencies when cyberspace effects cross geographic areas of responsibility, coordinate the integration of theater security cooperation cyberspace related activities with geographic combatant commands, and execute directed cyberspace operations. The same Unified Command Plan directs geographic combatant commands to execute authority over missions and assigned forces within their AORs, leading to uncertainty among the combatant commands about command and control relationships for operations in cyberspace. 2 Establishing clear roles, responsibilities, and command relationships in this rapidly evolving, growing, and operating domain is apparently a challenging task.
Despite several GAO reports finding necessity to clarify authorities and command and control relationships, there remains frustration and confusion across the Department of Defense as to who is in charge of what and when in cyberspace. 3 One report states, "Without complete and clearly articulated guidance on command and control responsibilities that is well-communicated and practiced with key stakeholders, DoD will have difficulty in achieving command and control of its cyber forces globally and in building unity of effort for carrying out cyber operations." 4 There also exists no specific joint doctrine which adequately address operations in cyberspace, merely a joint test publication with no current indication of when it will be finalized. Perceptions exist, however, of a cultural divide within the cyberspace community.
There seem to be two camps, even after progress was made consolidating functions to achieve unity of effort. Despite the consolidation of JTF-GNO (which handled the protect and defend aspect of DoD networks and cyberspace) and JFCC-NW (which handled the attack and exploit aspect of cyberspace) beneath CYBERCOM, the divide remains. Cyberspace focuses on cybersecurity and enumerates strategic initiatives to achieve national security objectives, defend national interests and effectively operate in the cyberspace domain. These initiatives build on and reinforce the president's International Strategy for Cyberspace, and focus DoD's strategic efforts for operating in cyberspace.
In addition to guidance on viewing cyberspace as an operational domain, strategy initiatives center on defensive concepts to protect DoD networks, partnerships to facilitate a whole of government cybersecurity strategy, and building allied relationships to improve collective cybersecurity. 19 The priorities identified in these guiding policy documents clearly illustrate the critical requirements for, and importance of an effective cyberspace posture capable of integrated full spectrum cyberspace operations. This cross-cutting concept and perspective relieves pressure on a "cyber boss" to achieve effects in isolation, integrating efforts across the staff and within other domains.
By virtue of the inherent regional perspective, EUCOM maintains a primary interest in the partnered relationships developed within the theater and how the functions/domains can enhance their relationships. A disadvantage of the USSOCOM model is the simple fact that most cyberspace operations do not take place within a single GCC, minimizing the need for a formal RCC which could be underutilized. Additionally, the mere global nature of the domain, includes potentially vast consequences when executing certain specific operations. This reality could force authorities to remain at the CYBERCOM level, minimizing the need for a specific command structure at the GCC. Establishing a RCC to conduct and control these types of operations could also be a costly and resource intense endeavor.
Finally, though unity of command and unity of effort may be achieved within a specific command structure and regionally, this construct could actually unhinge the overall cyberspace unity of effort due to the lack of functional alignment, creating a potential disconnected inefficiency with global cyberspace operations. The identified drawbacks to this model include additional manning requirements in an already critically constrained function, and a potential lack of confidence in the support of GCC priorities and required effects by CYBERCOM in a timely manner, caused by a weak command link to the GCC. The hybrid model attempts to provide centralized command and control in support of the global cyberspace mission (USTRANSCOM model) and a more specific functional command structure to support GCC requirements. The ultimate goal is to provide measured unity of command and unity of effort to attain effects globally and regionally. 36 One of the current arguments for centralized control of cyberspace effects likens cyberspace to the air domain. Limited, powerful and highly sought after air assets are centrally controlled by a single air commander focused on the broader scope of an operation, more effectively arbitrating competing tactical support demands against strategic and operational necessities. 37 The parallel cyberspace argument states, because cyberspace is a truly global domain that literally moves at the speed of light, it should be controlled centrally by a cyber operator at a cyber command with a global perspective. 38 The counterargument is air and cyberspace characteristics are not that similar.
Though a need exists to have a global perspective, there is less of a limit on asset management. This argument confuses limited asset management with effects -a desired outcome from a specific action. When addressed in its entirety, cyberspace is not overly constrained by devices/equipment and does not equate to air power in this perspective. Effects are achieved at many levels in cyberspace and can subsequently be managed, coordinated, supported, and controlled at many levels. There is a clear need for coordinated efforts as actions can have global effects, however regional situational awareness is often achieved at the AOR level with designated responsibilities and authorities granted to achieve a GCC's or JFC's desired effect as the supported war fighter. Many GCCs contend, a cyberspace operator at a cyber headquarters thousands of miles away will likely not understand the operational requirements necessary for integrated success in a particular JOA, let alone understand the local or regional commander's intent. There must be established, coordinated relationships to allow flexibility at the Joint Force Commander level while simultaneously protecting strategic/global interests. Similar to previously mentioned constructs, this could be achieved through a supporting relationship to a GCC with tactical control for operations within the AOR, while maintaining operational control of specific skill set cyberspace assets/personnel at CYBERCOM. The most feasible cyberspace command and control construct to achieve measured unity of command and unity of effort while facilitating dual global and regional focus is a blended hybrid model of the SOCOM and TRANSCOM models, with some minor modifications gleaned from the GCC perspectives. Under this structure, Regional
Cyberspace Centers (RCCs) within the GCCs would be responsible for synchronizing all aspects of cyberspace operations to include providing network services, defense of the DoD GIG, and conducting offensive cyberspace operations. The RCC would be colocated and integrated with the GCCs operations, intelligence, and plans functions to achieve synergy across the spectrum of operations. The GCC would maintain TACON of the RCC to allow for regional mission support and to achieve effects directed by the GCC and subordinate JFCs when employed. To meet the global support requirements of cyberspace operations, CYBERCOM would maintain an OPCON relationship with the RCC to support cyberspace efforts which cut across GCC boundaries. Though unity of command suffers in this construct, it is unrealistic to expect a globally focused functional command not to exercise some level of control over assets and operations that traverse beyond numerous geographical boundaries.
Keeping the RCC as a directorate or center instead of a specific regional functional command organization also allows for ease of staff coordination internally within the GCC staff and externally with CYBERCOM. Additionally, it allows for construct modification if necessary to meet changing requirements in the future. A formal cyber command organization brings unnecessary command and staff baggage, would limit the flexibility to respond to changing requirements, and would likely disrupt the purpose of rapid and streamlined coordination in this dynamic environment.
Despite the challenges presented by this unique domain, effects must be achieved globally and regionally. Several proposed command and control constructs attempt to clarify command lines and supporting/supported relationships. Each has advantages and disadvantages. There is no perfect solution for this dilemma.
Whichever command and control construct is ultimately decided, it must effectively address both global and regional realities. There must be a measured compromise to enable global capabilities to support regional priorities with regional situational awareness. There must also be an understanding of the global responsibility and boundary-less effects this domain permits. A balance must be struck to allow measured GCC prioritized effects to be achieved supporting the UCP directed AOR specific mission; along with similarly measured, consolidated, globally focused prioritized effects to be achieved in support of CYBERCOM's worldwide offensive and defensive mission as well.
No command and control construct will be ideal initially, and will likely require modification as requirements and the environment changes. However imperfect the determined command and control structure, it must be clear to those operating in, on or through this critical domain. Cyberspace transcends many traditional aspects in the physical and geographic world, but it still requires humans and forces to utilize it, and
they must know what they can do on, in and through it, and when.
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